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In Baird v. W ells, (1890) 44 Ch. O. 661 the plaintiff was 
a member of the Pelican Club, and it was brought to the attention 
of the committee bv, appropriately enough, the Marquis of Quecnsbcrry 
that the plaintiff had been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member 
in that while attending a prize-fight between two pugilists names 
Smith and Slavin, he had engaged a group of “roughs” (sic) to attend 
and hurl abuse, inter alia, at Slavin. W hether these unsportsmanlike (by 
1890 standards) tactics had any tangible effect on the result of the 
contest docs not appear from the report, but they were sufficient to 
cause the committee to expel the plaintiff from the Pelicans. Stirling 
J., after finding that the committcc had acted ultra vires, dccidcd that 
as the organization was a proprietary- club, there was no right of property 
in the members, hcncc an injunction would not lie. Ilowever lie did 
sav there might be a right in damages for infringement of the member’s 
contract right to have the personal use and enjoyment of the club 
so long as lie complied with its rules.
Young v. Ladies’ Imperial Club, (1920) 2 K.B. was a case 
in which the Court of Appeal granted damages, albeit nominal, (one 
farthing), to a lady expelled by a committee of the defendant, also 
a proprietary club, on the grounds that the resolution was ultra vires. 
It seems the plaintiff made an uncomplimcntarv remark about a fellow 
member, a Mrs. Lawrence. T he executive, all ladies, met and e x i l e d  
the plaintiff, but without bothering to notifv the Duchess of Abcrcorn, 
who had agreed to serve on the executive for prestige purposes, with 
the proviso that she should not be troubled in am wav. The executive 
stated the duchess wouldn’t have come anvwav if she had been notified, 
and submitted that, that should be the end of the matter. Scrutton, L.J. 
rejecting that contention, said “ I think there is some public importance 
in making dear to club committees that tlicv must act rcgularlv in the 
expulsion of members.”
T he courts in these two cases felt damages should Ixj awarded 
for ultra vires acts of committees resulting in infringement of the minor 
right to be able to enjoy the use of club property. Minor when com­
pared to the major results of an invalici resolution in the rcccnt case 
of Abbott v. Sullivan, by which a man was deprived of his livelihood 
for nearly a vear, and vet the English Court of Appeal refused to allow 
damages.
In that case the plaintiff was a corn porter in the London docks. 
A prerequisite of such employment was that a man should be accepted 
bv the Overside Corn Porter’s Com mittee and pjaccd on the register 
of corn porters. Upon acceptance, he agreed to submit to the juris­
diction of the committcc and to observe its working rules. However, 
there was no written constitution or rules, and w hile all members of the 
committee were members of the Transport and General W orker’s
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Union, it was not a committee of the union in the sense of being part 
of its organization recognised and constituted by the union rules. 
A complaint was made against the plaintiff, and the committe after 
a hearing, fined him, being advised in their deliberations by Mr. 
Platt, a divisional officer of the union. Following the  meeting the 
plaintiff followed Platt into the street and struck him. Platt promptly 
convened an emergency meeting of the committee which unaminously 
resolved that as the plaintiff was guilty of an unwarranted and un­
provoked assualt on a trade union official, he should be removed from 
the register of corn porters. It should be mentioned at this point that 
M r Platt was found by the trial judge to have been acting without malice 
in any degree or other improper notive. But, as Sir Raymond Evershed 
remarked, at 231, “It is, unfortunately, the not uncommon experience 
of human affairs that the greatest disasters and troubles flow from 
the actions of men acting under the best possible motives.” The 
com mittee’s resolution was effective September 24th, 1947. The 
plaintiff appealed to the area committee of tne union who recommended 
that he snould be reinstated on the register,-and this was done on 
July 12, 1948. T he plaintiff sued for, inter alia, damages, against 
Suilivan and Isett, who were two of the members of the nine-man 
committee; and Platt. W hy Messrs. Sullivan and Isett were selected 
is somewhat of a mystery, and one on which the court is unable to 
throw any light.
All three members of the court agreed with the trial judge 
who found that as the committee did not have jurisdicition to take 
disciplinary action as a result of an allegation of a common assult in 
the street on a trade union official, the resolution of September 24th, 
1947, was invalid. There being no written constitution, the onus 
was on the defendants to show tnat jurisdiction existed founded on an 
express or implied contract mutually entered into, and this they were 
unable to do.
Evershed, M.R., in the majority, felt that the plaintiffs claim 
had to rest on some contract, either express or implied, made by every 
corn porter with the committee, and w-hich was broken by the passing 
of the invalid resolution; and he appears to have rested his decision on 
his inability to find any express or implied contractual term that 
a man once received into the company of corn porters should not 
thereafter be excluded by the committee from the company save for 
breach by him of some specified rules. Apparently in order to dispose 
of the Baird case and cases involving statutory tribunals where damages 
had been awarded, he rejected the notion that “ in the case of a body 
such as that under discussion any relevant or useful analogy can be 
be found by reference to tribunals established by statute and having 
a limited jurisdiction conferred on them by statute, or by reference 
to proprietary clubs.”
Morris, L.J., also in the majority, conceded that where there 
is an exercise of judical functions by a court, then inquiry may be 
taken as to whether the Court had knowledge or the means of knowledge
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of its abscncc of jurisdiction. However lie felt the committee should 
not be judged on this footing, not bcin<* a court. It is submitted 
this view is unreal, in this age of quasi-judicial functions by tribunals 
other than courts, and into whose jurisdiction an inquiry may generally 
be instituted.
Denning, L.J., dissenting, took his characteristic functional 
approach to the question, and disagreed with the trial judge’s refusal 
to award damages because the latter could not see any legal peg on 
which to hang it. l ie  thought there was a wrong because the com­
m ittee should have known their act was ultra vires, and was unable to 
sec why the same results should not flow whether the tribunal was 
statutory, domestic, within a proprietary club, or, as here, part of a vol­
untary association. He says “A mistake of law does not excuse a statu­
tory tribunal; Houlden v. Smith (1850) 14 O.B. 841 and it should 
not excuse a domestic tribunal.”
The result of the case would seem to be that in order to ensure 
that actions for damages will not lie against them, should they act 
without jurisdiction, even if they so act in an arbitrary or capricious 
fashion, voluntary associations should refrain from committing to 
writing their organization, constitution, rules or regulations.
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